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SLACK RESOURCES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
PRIVATELY HELD FIRMS
GERARD GEORGE
University of Wisconsin—Madison
Empirical findings from publicly traded firms and behavioral arguments suggest a
positive influence of resource slack on financial performance. While this area has
remained unexplored in privately held firms, conceptual arguments indicate that
resource constraints may enhance performance. Longitudinal data on 900 privately
held firms confirm the differing influences of forms of slack on performance. Results
indicate that a combination of behavioral and resource constraints arguments are
necessary to explain the slack-performance relationship in privately held firms. The
implications of these findings for theories of resources and entrepreneurship are
discussed.
Organizations are continually challenged to fos-
ter growth and improve performance while endur-
ing strong exogenous pressures and endogenous
constraints. Management scholars have offered
strategic and behavioral explanations of factors that
induce or impel organizations to compete and excel
in these evolving competitive landscapes. An emer-
gent dialog within this paradigm is the role of re-
sources and their influence on managers’ aspira-
tions. Resources act as inducements to experiment,
take risks, and make proactive strategic choices.
Resources are also deployed to build capabilities
that make firms competitive, maintain coalitions
that ensure the convergence of personal and organ-
izational goals, and act as buffers in periods of
economic duress. Given this critical role, the pres-
ence or absence of excess resources and their im-
pact on performance carries substantive implica-
tions for scholarship in organizational theory and
the practice of management.
Slack is potentially utilizable resources that can
be diverted or redeployed for the achievement of
organizational goals. These resources vary in type
(e.g., social or financial capital) and form (e.g., dis-
cretionary or nondiscretionary). Studies have used
financial slack in different forms as a predictor of
risk taking (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), innova-
tion (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), and performance (Bro-
miley, 1991; Tan & Peng, 2003). Some researchers
have noted that explanations for the influence of
different forms of slack on performance do not ar-
ticulate a priori arguments but tend to present post
hoc rationalizations (Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000;
Greve, 2003). Additionally, studies have focused
on publicly traded firms and have largely ignored
privately held firms, leaving a gap in scholars’ un-
derstanding of how financial slack may influence
performance in these firms. Privately held firms
tend to be undercapitalized (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
& Rosen, 1994a, 1994b) and the mechanisms by
which slack influences performance may vary, as
managers of privately held firms differ in their de-
cision-making process from their counterparts in
public firms (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). In this ar-
ticle, I articulate differing relationships between
the forms of financial slack and the performance of
privately held firms.
Two theoretical streams help explain the role of
slack in privately held firms: research on the be-
havioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963;
March, 1994), and the resource constraints litera-
ture (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Mosakowski, 2002).
Behavioral theory treats firms as coalitions of ac-
tors, and its proponents argue that slack provides
opportunities for managers to appease their politi-
cal coalitions by allowing parties to pursue their
own agendas (Cyert & March, 1963). Researchers
have amplified this concept by arguing that slack
relaxes internal controls and creates funds that can
be redirected toward projects with uncertain out-
comes, fostering an environment for innovation.
Along these lines, evidence indicates a positive
effect of slack on the innovation and performance
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of public firms (Bromiley, 1991; Damanpour, 1987;
Greve, 2003).
Alternatively, according to studies that can col-
lectively be termed the resource constraints litera-
ture, firms with fewer resources are likely to lever-
age them more efficiently (Baker & Nelson, 2005;
Starr & Macmillan, 1990). The claim is that re-
source constraints alter the behavior by which re-
sources are garnered and expended, forcing manag-
ers to improve allocative efficiency. While the
resource constraints literature has tended to focus
on entrepreneurial firms, I believe that the theoret-
ical assumptions of resource constraints, private
ownership, and private ownership’s implications
for managerial behavior are similar for entrepre-
neurial and privately held firms. Most entrepre-
neurial firms are privately held, but entrepreneur-
ial firms typically have higher growth rates than
other private firms. For example, studies using pri-
vately held firms and entrepreneurial firm samples
concur that resources are sparse in both types of
firms and elicit “bootstrapping” modes of manage-
rial responses (Baker, Pricer, & Nenide, 2000;
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, 1994b). Similarly, entre-
preneurial new ventures and privately held firms
exhibit comparable managerial responses to re-
source utilization, as ownership structures in these
firms are homogeneous and foster risk taking
(George, Zahra, & Wiklund, 2005). Accordingly, I
develop arguments using both behavioral theory
and the resource constraints literature.
Some studies have used economic arguments to
articulate the influence of slack on firm perfor-
mance (e.g., Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000). Popular
among them are agency theory, according to which
the interests of firms’ owners (principals) and man-
agers (agents) may diverge (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), and X-efficiency theory, according to which
firms are necessarily inefficient in the allocation of
resources (Leibenstein, 1980). Agency theory may
not be as applicable in privately held firms as in
large public firms because in private firms, princi-
pals and agents are more likely to be the same
individuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Though there
are recent conceptual arguments that some agency
relationships may exist in family-owned private
businesses, empirical validation is limited. There-
fore, I build my arguments using organizational
theories on slack. In some instances, I reconcile
these arguments with X-efficiency theory.
Scholars have articulated two critical influences
on an organization’s ability to utilize resources ef-
fectively, namely, age and environment (Stinch-
combe, 1965; Thompson, 1967). Age is an impor-
tant moderator of the effectiveness with which
firms deploy resources. Some firms are created
with substantial resource endowments, while oth-
ers are disadvantaged at founding and are born out
of scarcity. Young firms may be particularly vul-
nerable to the quantity of their resource endow-
ments. Excess resources permit investments in de-
veloping capabilities to overcome the liabilities of
newness in start-ups, thereby increasing the prob-
ability of survival (Hannan, 1998). As firms evolve
with age, they may require resources to renew ca-
pabilities or build new competencies, whereas
other established firms may have fewer resource
demands. Therefore, studying the impact of age
provides insights into the effectiveness with which
young and old firms deploy their slack resources to
improve performance.
Slack resources allow firms to adapt to complex
competitive landscapes (Levinthal, 1997), thereby
impacting firm performance. Industry complexity
refers to the competition in an industry that stems
from concentration, or the market share dominance
of one or more firms (Dess & Beard, 1984). The
presence of adequate or excess resource endow-
ments provides the flexibility for a firm to decide
on a course of action when trying to adapt to its
environment (Thompson, 1967). Slack resources
also help buffer firms from environmental shocks
and influence the enactment of strategies. Firms
may adapt to industry complexity by reconfiguring
their resource endowments to form new capabili-
ties or by shifting resources into or away from their
existing markets. Firms with larger slack resource
endowments are more likely to have freedom in
their responses to competitor strategies, thereby in-
fluencing performance. This study extends existing
literature by capturing the influence of age and
industry complexity as moderators of the slack-
performance relationship.
The significance of this research is threefold. The
impact of resource deployment on the achievement
of organizational goals is fundamental to theories of
how organizations act, evolve, and perform. A ma-
jor contribution of this study is to distinguish
among forms of slack and to articulate the pattern
of their relationships with performance. Second, it
is the first longitudinal study of slack in privately
held firms. Even though there are more than 25
million such firms, generating over 70 percent of
U.S. employment (Small Business Administration
[SBA], 2003), previous studies of slack have not
focused on the relevance and patterns of slack in
privately held firms. There are substantial difficul-
ties with collecting reliable data for privately held
firms. Their owners tend to be more reluctant to
share financial and other information than the
managers of publicly traded firms, creating barriers
that could explain the low number of large-sample
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longitudinal studies. Given a void in behavioral
explanations of privately held firm actions, some
authors have called for a systematic investigation of
this topic (Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001). Finally, I
examine the effects of age and environment on the
slack-performance relationship. Investigating the
nexus of organizational and environmental influ-
ences on the accumulation and deployment of
slack resources strengthens the contributions of
this study to management theory and practice.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Slack is used to stabilize a firm’s operations by
absorbing excess resources during periods of
growth and by allowing firms to maintain their
aspirations and internal commitments during peri-
ods of distress (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal &
March, 1981; Meyer, 1982). Slack provides that
cushion of actual or potential resources that allows
an organization to adapt successfully to internal
pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate
changes in strategy (Bourgeois, 1981). Through this
dual internal and external role, slack influences
performance.
Only three conceptual studies have articulated a
rationale for the existence of forms of slack (Bour-
geois, 1981; Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Sharfman,
Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). These studies have
forwarded classifications of slack based on mana-
gerial discretion in the deployment of resources.
Sharfman and colleagues suggested that slack re-
sources are anchored along a continuum of mana-
gerial discretion, wherein “low-discretion slack”
provides less flexibility to managers and their stra-
tegic options. These authors noted that absorbed
slack, or excess costs in specialized assets, is low
discretion, while unabsorbed slack is high discre-
tion. Though the discretionary dimension is con-
tinuous, these authors argued that low- and high-
discretion slack coexist and often are employed
together, implying nonexclusivity in forms of slack
resources. Examples of high-discretion financial re-
sources are cash and receivables, and low-discre-
tion resources may include debt, fixed assets, and
excess capacity. It is important to recognize that
both low- and high-discretion slack resources offer
implicit benchmarks for managers of their own
firm’s resources as compared to their competitors’.
This comparison of absolute levels of resources
may motivate managers’ strategic actions and com-
petitive behaviors.
In privately held firms, the allocation and utili-
zation of resources are likely to dominate manage-
rial decisions. Using the personal tax returns of
private business owners, Holtz-Eakin and coau-
thors (1994a) found that when extra resources were
introduced through windfall gains such as inheri-
tance, these businesses tended to have higher sur-
vival rates and to disclose earnings increases of up
to 20 percent in subsequent years. These authors
attributed this increase in earnings to productive
investments, in capital equipment, for example,
suggesting that private firms are undercapitalized
and resource infusion enhances performance. Al-
though researchers have found that in public firms,
low- and high-discretion resources vary in their
impacts on performance, it is unlikely that similar
relationships hold in privately held firms. Tan and
Peng (2003) noted that organizational theory was
useful to explain a positive relationship between
high-discretion slack and performance, while
agency theory could better explain the negative
performance impact of low-discretion slack. These
authors argued that managers of public firms
tended to exhibit agency problems when low-dis-
cretion slack was available, perhaps by implement-
ing excessive diversification. However, as agency
issues are minimized in privately held firms be-
cause owners tend to be managers as well, diver-
gence in the effects of high- and low-discretion
resources is unlikely. Therefore, I expect both low-
and high-discretion slack to be positively related to
performance, as the presence of slack implies that
these firms are adequately capitalized rather than
undercapitalized.
Behavioral arguments suggest that slack en-
hances experimentation and risk taking, which in-
fluence the innovativeness (Nohria & Gulati, 1996)
and performance (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986) of
large firms. Therefore, I see two reasons for the
positive effect of both high- and low-discretion
slack on the performance of privately held firms.
First, slack eases capital restrictions and improves
the strategic choices of managers for investments
with positive performance implications. Second, it
allows experimentation and risk taking, which may
also have positive performance consequences.
However, performance declines are likely to be
seen at higher levels of slack. Slack may insulate a
firm from exogenous shocks (Thompson, 1967), en-
gendering managerial complacency or irrational
optimism. Firms with large resource reserves might
be less impelled to undertake initiatives through
experimentation, which may decrease performance
because new entrepreneurial opportunities are not
exploited. Another possibility is that managers may
become overly optimistic and implement inappro-
priate strategic actions (Cooper, Dunkelberg, &
Woo, 1988; de Meza and Southey, 1996) that de-
crease performance (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989).
Private managers may be susceptible to biases in
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decision making such as the planning fallacy
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1994) and escalation of com-
mitment (Ross & Staw, 1993). The planning fallacy
consists of overconfidence about the duration and
viability of projects, and escalation of commitment
involves defending and continuing a course of ac-
tion in spite of negative outcomes. Both biases are
likely to occur at high levels of slack. If managers
perceive that their absolute levels of both high- and
low-discretion slack far exceed those of competi-
tors, they are likely to be more optimistic about
courses of action and may inadvertently implement
strategic actions that decrease performance. There-
fore,
Hypothesis 1a. In privately held firms, finan-
cial performance will increase and then de-
crease with increases in high-discretion slack.
Hypothesis 1b. In privately held firms, finan-
cial performance will increase and then de-
crease with increases in low-discretion slack.
Dynamism in the generation and deployment of
slack resources is important to the evolution of
managerial behavior and firm strategy (Greve, 2003;
Levinthal & March, 1981). Prior studies have fo-
cused on “absolute” levels of slack rather than
slack “relative to demand.” Although organiza-
tions’ aspiration levels change with a concomitant
need to generate slack (March, 1994), researchers
have not explored the implications of resource de-
mand on the slack-performance relationship. Even
though this availability-demand concept has been
theorized (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Sharfman et
al., 1988), the tendency in empirical analyses has
been to emphasize the excess resources of a firm
relative to its industry or comparison group, rather
than excess resources relative to the focal firm’s
operational demands.
Here, I introduce transient slack, defining it as
excess resources available after resource demands
for operations have been met. The concept of tran-
sient slack emphasizes the ephemeral nature of
slack, whereas both high- and low-discretion slack
capture absolute levels (as compared to peer firms’
resources). This distinction is theoretically mean-
ingful and important for two reasons. First, tran-
sient slack separates resource availability from the
resource demands placed on a system. By doing so,
it emphasizes the temporal patterns of an organiza-
tion’s resource generation and deployment profiles,
as the goals and the needs of an organization evolve
in a dynamic competitive landscape. Second, one
can uniquely identify the performance effects of
resource availability and resource demand using
transient slack. That is, firms facing high demands
but having few resources, like many growth-ori-
ented firms, may enact materially different strate-
gies from firms with greater resource availability
but lower demands. This comparison of availability
and demand is pertinent to studying privately held
firms as well as new ventures where entrepreneurs
cobble together resources to satisfy needs (Baker &
Nelson, 2005). Therefore, I develop arguments for
transient slack, as it provides valuable and relevant
insights into the impact of resources on perfor-
mance, especially in entrepreneurial firms.
Behavioral theory and resource constraints argu-
ments appear to diverge with regard to predictions
for transient slack. Behavioral arguments suggest
that resource demand and its availability are inter-
twined. That is, slack not only reflects absolute
levels across peer firms but also is relative to inter-
nal needs such as maintaining coalitions (Cyert &
March, 1963; March, 1994). Both the absolute and
relative levels of slack influence managerial choice,
engendering experimentation and risk taking that
have positive performance consequences. Here, be-
havioral arguments lead to a positive relationship
between transient slack and performance.
However, the literature on resource constraints
suggests that firms with fewer resources than their
operational demands require are likely to be more
efficient as they find ways to leverage and stretch
their available resources. Supporting the resource
constraints argument, some authors have hypothe-
sized that firms bootstrap their limited resources to
achieve goals (Levi-Strauss, 1966; Starr & MacMil-
lan, 1990). In a cross-sectional sample of 177 pri-
vately held firms, Baker, Pricer, and Nenide (2000)
found that undercapitalized firms “outperformed”
those with excess capital. These authors inferred
that resource constraints bridled the optimism of
managers. Economic arguments of X-efficiency
(Leibenstein, 1980) are also consistent with the re-
source constraints literature. Leibenstein suggested
that firms are inefficient in the deployment of re-
sources. Therefore, if demands for resources exceed
their availability, firms are likely to be more effi-
cient in the deployment of resources to enhance
performance.
My view is that behavioral arguments and re-
source constraints arguments are not necessarily
incongruent but operate at different slack levels.
When transient slack is negative (demand substan-
tially exceeds availability), privately held firms
may bootstrap and find more efficient and effective
uses for limited capital. However, at higher levels
of transient slack (availability substantially exceeds
demand), firms may begin to experiment and be-
come proactive in their strategic choices. At zero or
marginally positive levels of transient slack (avail-
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ability equals demand), the incentives to experi-
ment or bootstrap are minimal. Combining these
arguments, I expect a curvilinear relationship in
which performance is high when transient slack is
substantially positive or substantially negative but
in which performance is low when transient slack
is near zero. Given that transient slack is a function
of resource availability and demand, I hypothesize
separate relationships:
Hypothesis 2a. In privately held firms, resource
availability will be related in a curvilinear
manner with financial performance. Specifi-
cally, performance will decrease and then in-
crease with increases in resource availability.
Hypothesis 2b. In privately held firms, resource
demand will be related in a curvilinear manner
with financial performance. Specifically, per-
formance will increase and then decrease with
increases in resource demand.
The Influence of Age
A unique moderator of the slack-performance re-
lationship is likely to be the age of a firm. Younger
firms may behave differently in evolving land-
scapes than older, more established firms. Slack is
also time-dependent in both its accumulation and
its deployment (Cyert & March, 1963; Sharfman et
al., 1988; Thompson, 1967). Accordingly, age and
slack levels are likely to be positively related. Be-
havioral arguments suggest that as firms grow
older, the number of their internal political coali-
tions also increases. Managers anticipate and de-
ploy slack as a means to appease these coalitions.
For example, managers induce experimentation
and risk taking by funding multiple projects that
have profit potential and by searching for alterna-
tive competencies (Levinthal & March, 1981;
March, 1994). By increasing experimentation, these
older firms are likely to enjoy higher performance
than younger firms that possess fewer resources
with which they can experiment.
Scholars have suggested that resources assume
greater importance in young firms (e.g., Stinch-
combe, 1965). Some have argued that substantial
resource endowments at a younger age may provide
for greater investments in capability development,
enhancing a firm’s prospects for survival (Hannan,
1998). However, young firms tend to be resource-
constrained and to suffer from the “liability of new-
ness,” and they are thus less likely to have the
experience to predict their resource needs. There-
fore, young firms are likely to make less efficient
use of resource slack than older firms. Sharfman
and coauthors (1988) argued that older firms have
had the opportunity to experiment with different
types of resources and select the ones that best fit
their demands. These firms, owing to their matu-
rity, have more predictable needs and can better
envision slack deployment to improve perfor-
mance. In sum, older firms are more likely to pos-
sess large amounts of slack than younger firms and
to be aware of their resource demands, conditions
that help the older firms generate and deploy slack
effectively. Therefore, I posit the following moder-
ated effect:
Hypothesis 3. In privately held firms, the im-
pact of slack on performance will be more pos-
itive in older firms than in younger firms.
The Influence of Industry Complexity
The competitive environment in which firms in-
teract plays a critical role in their survival and
performance (Levinthal, 1997). Publicly held and
privately held firms compete in overlapping prod-
uct-markets and may use similar distribution chan-
nels and suppliers. Therefore, it becomes critical
for firms to adapt their strategies to their competi-
tive environments. Industry complexity signifi-
cantly influences the enactment of strategic re-
sponses. As noted above, industry complexity
refers to the competition arising from high concen-
tration of market share among a few dominant play-
ers (Dess & Beard, 1984). For example, large firms
control the market and restrict smaller players’ stra-
tegic choices, including pricing power, branding,
and leverage in distribution and logistics. In com-
plex industries, slack protects an organization from
environmental pressures. By being insulated, the
managers of privately held firms are not compelled
to enact responses to the strategic moves of com-
petitors that might decrease financial performance.
In complex environments, the managers of pri-
vately held firms are also likely to be constrained in
their strategic choices. When slack is present, these
managers perceive it as some guarantee of firm
survival and execute “satisficing” rather than per-
formance-maximizing strategies (March, 1994;
Sharfman et al., 1988). Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and
Chen (1991) found a negative relationship between
slack and the probability of reacting to competitor
actions: managerial responses were attenuated be-
cause of the buffer of extra resources. When slack is
high, managers may deny that solutions exist and
become rigid in their strategies (Staw, Sandelands,
& Dutton, 1981), stances that negatively impact per-
formance. This behavioral reasoning is consistent
with economic arguments that firms are inefficient
in their deployment of resources (Leibenstein,
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1980), and an industry environment where profit-
ability is low is likely to exacerbate this perfor-
mance effect. Therefore, I posit a second moderated
effect:
Hypothesis 4. In privately held firms, the im-
pact of slack on performance becomes more
negative in high-complexity industries than in
low-complexity industries.
DATA AND MEASURES
A sample with diverse industry structures and
competitive conditions was developed through se-
lection of five technology-intensive industries (Na-
tional Science Foundation, 2000) and five non-
technology-intensive industries, and 43 subsectors;
industry was defined at the three-digit SIC level,
and subsector, at the four-digit level. The industries
included were meat-packing products, textiles, pa-
per and packaging, wood products, metal products,
computers and equipment, pharmaceuticals, elec-
tronics, instrumentation, and telecommunications.
By including multiple industries, the sample incor-
porates high variation in industry and firm growth
rates (Dess & Beard, 1984), which may be material
to the accumulation and deployment of slack. The
data were drawn from the Dun & Bradstreet data-
base and supplemented with data from Ward’s
Business Directory of Privately Held Firms. We se-
lected a four-year window (1994–97) because slack
may be accumulated and deployed over time. This
window also maximized the number of firms re-
porting financial data for contiguous years, yield-
ing a sample of 900 firms (3,598 observations).
We used financial ratios for calculating slack, as
has been done in other studies (Bromiley, 1991;
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Singh, 1986). The
use of financial ratios follows from arguments that
financial data provide verifiable indicators of man-
agerial behavior (Bourgeois, 1981; Tan & Peng,
2003). Though slack can exist in organizational ca-
pabilities and other assets, it is difficult to capture
such slack in a longitudinal sample of private
firms. While surveys might provide finer-grained
measures, sampling and temporal variability would
raise concerns of measurement error and validity. I
calculated the financial measures of slack for each
of the four years.
For high-discretion slack, I measured the level of
cash reserves in a given year. Cash is the most
easily deployed resource and provides managers
the greatest degree of freedom in allocating it to
alternate uses. For low-discretion slack, I measured
the debt-to-equity ratio. In private firms, debt ca-
pacity is typically lower than in publicly traded
firms because the private firms tend to be under-
capitalized (i.e., have less equity in the business).
With higher debt levels, the freedom to reallocate
resources or raise additional debt to meet expedient
needs becomes restricted. Private firms also tend to
raise debt and invest these funds in fixed assets;
debt thereby serves to temper managerial overcon-
fidence (deMeza & Southey, 1996). The measures
are consistent with those adopted in other studies
of publicly traded firms (Bromiley, 1991; Deep-
house & Wiseman, 2000).
For transient slack, I developed two measures to
capture the ephemeral nature of slack. Resource
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa
Variablesa Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Firm size 16.54 2.21
2. Industry profitability 0.06 0.04 .02
3. Number of competitors 185.10 98.50 .15 .12
4. Size of competitors 3,787.50 2,622.00 .11 .25 .25
5. Industry complexity 0.21 0.23 .13 .23 .67 .09
6. Number of plants 0.50 0.50 .60 .02 .19 .02 .11
7. Firm age 19.30 19.40 .31 .03 .12 .08 .00 .13
8. Family management 0.32 0.46 .30 .05 .35 .11 .29 .23 .07
9. High-discretion slackb, c 41.10 305.30 .34 .00 .09 .02 .05 .12 .21 .09
10. Low-discretion slackd 0.00 24.29 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .02 .03
11. Resource availabilityc 20.10 781.80 .09 .01 .01 .03 .00 .03 .22 .02 .40 .02
12. Resource demandc 104.80 768.20 .37 .01 .05 .04 .05 .13 .27 .08 .84 .01 .61
13. Performancec 147.08 707.70 .53 .01 .09 .03 .07 .19 .39 .12 .67 .01 .27 .71
a Number of observations  3,598. Correlations above .03 are significant at p  .05. Year and industry dummies are not reported.
b Cash.
c Millions of dollars.
d Debt-to-equity ratio.
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availability was the permanent capital of a firm
(i.e., owner’s equity plus debt) less fixed assets and
other noncurrent assets. Resource demand was an
estimate of cash required (five days worth of sales)
plus accounts receivable and inventory less ac-
counts payable. Though these measures are margin-
ally complex, they have advantages over other mea-
sures used in previous research. First, measures
such as the current ratio reflect short-term assets
relative to short-term liabilities and do not accu-
rately reflect a firm’s resource requirements. Sec-
ond, separating availability from demand helps to
differentiate among patterns of resource deploy-
ment and allows testing if higher performance re-
sults from resource constraint—that is, demand is
greater than availability. This measure is also used
in financial software packages for loan default pre-
dictions (e.g., Fintel).
Given the variety in industry context in the sam-
ple, it is likely that slack also differs across indus-
tries. Since slack is operationally defined as excess
absolute levels of resources (Nohria & Gulati, 1996),
I calculated slack as the deviation from the mean of
each of the 43 industry subsectors. This procedure
provided a close estimate of excess resources com-
pared to industry norms. The recalculated data
were used for the analyses.
Firm age was years since incorporation. Industry
complexity was Herfindahl’s index of homogeneity
in industry competition and concentration of re-
sources, measured as the sum of the squared market
shares of publicly traded firms in a sector (four-
digit SIC). This index assumes a value of 0 to 1,
where 0 reflects perfect competition among numer-
ous incumbents with infinitesimal market shares.
A high value represents large players and a dispro-
portionate concentration of sales that restricts
smaller firms’ ability to enhance performance by
limiting their strategic choices (Dess & Beard,
1984). High concentration is associated with high
industry complexity.
Performance was gross profit, calculated as rev-
enues less the cost of goods sold. Gross profit, a
good indicator of profitability, was correlated with
net income at .94 (p  .0001) and with net worth at
.96 (p  .0001). We refrained from using net
income or net worth because possible variability
in the tax treatment of income in private firms
might undermine the reliability of estimates of
performance.
Control variables for year, industry, and firm ef-
fects were also used. For year effects, I dummy-
coded each year as a categorical variable to help
control for the performance effects of any general
economic event or trend. For industry effects, I
included five measures. Industry profitability was
the average return on assets (ROA) of publicly
traded firms operating in the same industry as a
sample firm. A high ROA would suggest that the
industry was profitable and had the potential to
generate slack. Number of competitors was the
number of public firms competing in the same in-
dustry as the sample firm, and size of competitors
was the average number of employees of those pub-
lic firms. Finally, I included industry dummy vari-
ables for each three-digit SIC code represented in
the sample. Data for variables on publicly traded
companies were drawn from Standard & Poor’s
COMPUSTAT.
The firm effects for which I controlled were firm
size, number of plants, and type of management.
Because slack is likely to be size dependent, con-
trolling for size effects is important. Transforma-
tions such as the logarithmic value of slack vari-
ables are ineffective in controlling for size owing to
attrition in sample size when the mean-centered
slack variables are transformed. Also, dividing
slack variables by assets would have confounded
analyses here through common denominators in
regression equations, leading to biased estimates.
Therefore, an independent control for firm size, the
logarithm of the value of sales in a given year, was
used here. For number of plants, I included a cat-
egorical variable if a firm had multiple plant loca-
tions (single plant  0). This measure partially
controls for firm size, as larger firms are also likely
to have multiple locations. Finally, a categorical
variable for family management was included,
coded 1 if a firm was categorized as family-owned
by Ward’s Directory.
METHODS AND RESULTS
Using ordinary least squares to estimate panel
data can result in biased estimates because of un-
observed heterogeneity. Although a random- or
fixed-effects model can capture these relationships,
such a model would not account for autocorrela-
tion and heteroskedasticity (unequal error variance
in the regression errors) in time series data. I
adopted a cross-sectional time series feasible gen-
eralized least squares (FGLS) regression model be-
cause it provided reliable estimates in the presence
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Wool-
dridge, 2002). Table 1 reports the descriptive sta-
tistics and correlations between the variables. The
inclusion of slack variables and moderating effects
increased model fit and explanatory power signifi-
cantly; Table 2 gives the results of the FGLS regres-
sion analyses. The “log-likelihood” increased from
–18,203.7 for the base model to –12,653.7 for the
full model.
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To check for robustness across different model
specifications, I conducted a time series fixed-ef-
fects analysis, finding significant change in the
amounts of variance explained (baseline model,
R2  .30 [F  21.16, p  .0001]; model with “main
effects” added, R2 .41 [F129.23, p .0001]; full
model, including interaction effects, R2  .56 [F 
184.20, p  .0001]). Also, to check if the results
were sensitive to firm size beyond the control vari-
ables used, I included the product terms of the
slack variables and total firm assets as predictors.
The pattern and significance of the results did not
change, with the exception of low-discretion slack,
where the squared term remained significant in the
direction reported in Table 2, but the main effect
became statistically insignificant. I also analyzed
lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) and time series
Arellano-Bond models with one- and two-year lags.
When lagged models were included, the number of
observations was reduced by half (data had to be
available for four contiguous years). As heteroske-
dasticity (as determined by a Sargan test) was sig-
nificant, the Arellano-Bond models required two-
step estimators that did not provide reliable
coefficient estimates. Since heteroskedasticity is a
concern, I report the FGLS estimates controlling for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation across panels
using STATA statistical software.
TABLE 2
Cross-Sectional Time-Series FGLS Estimates of Slack as a Predictor of Performancea
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Firm size 26.00*** ( 2.21) 3.45*** (0.62) 2.85*** (0.69)
Industry profitability 18.85 (25.38) 6.49 (6.92) 7.92 (6.78)
Number of competitors 0.03 ( 0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01)
Size of competitors .0007 ( 0.001) .0003† (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Industry complexity 2.31 ( 9.69) 0.13 (2.84) 0.72 (2.81)
Number of plants 17.30** ( 5.96) 3.03* (1.48) 2.36 (1.58)
Firm age 1.23*** ( 0.24) 0.18** (0.06) 0.08 (0.06)
Family management 4.39 ( 5.75) 1.55 (1.44) 1.04 (1.46)
High-discretion slack 0.92*** (0.04) 0.32** (0.11)
High-discretion slack squared .00001 (0.00001) 0.00007 (0.0001)
Low-discretion slack 0.07*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Low-discretion slack squared 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.00006† (0.00003)
Resource availability 0.15*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Resource availability squared .00001*** ( .000003) 0.000004 (0.000003)
Resource demand 1.22*** (0.03) 1.20*** (0.03)
Resource demand squared .0001*** ( .000004) 0.00006*** (0.00001)
High-discretion slack  firm age 0.01*** (0.001)
High-discretion slack  age 0.000001* (0.000001)
High-discretion slack  complexity 1.79* (0.73)
High-discretion slack squared  complexity 0.0001 (0.001)
Low-discretion slack  age
Low-discretion slack squared  age
Low-discretion slack  complexity
Low-discretion slack squared  complexity
Resource availability  age
Resource availability squared  age
Resource availability  complexity
Resource availability squared  complexity
Resource demand  age
Resource demand squared  age
Resource demand  complexity
Resource demand squared  complexity
Constant 412.30*** 56.71*** 45.13***
Log-likelihood 18,203.70 14,424.40 14,133.60
Wald 2 161.17*** 3,328.01*** 2,596.70***
Incremental change (2) 2,447.70*** 102.83***
a Number of observations  3,598; number of firms  900. Year and industry controls are included but not reported. Unstandardized
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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As for the individual hypotheses, the nonlinear
relationship between high-discretion slack and per-
formance was not supported (Hypothesis 1a). The
linear positive term was significant (p  .001), but
not the squared term (model 2, Table 2). Hypothesis
1b, stating an increase and subsequent decrease in
performance with increases in low-discretion
slack, was supported (p  .001). Since transient
slack was composed of resource availability and
resource demand, testing their individual effects
(rather than deriving a difference score measure)
also allowed the parameter estimates to adjust in-
dependently rather than forcing the estimates to be
equal. The curvilinear relationship between re-
source availability and performance was signifi-
cant. Interestingly, both the linear and squared
terms were negative and significant (p  .001),
findings that were contrary to the hypothesized
increase in performance at high levels of resource
availability (Hypothesis 2a). Hypothesis 2b, which
states that there will be a curvilinear relationship
between resource demand and performance with a
positive linear coefficient (p  .001) and a negative
squared term, was supported (p  .001).
To test the interaction effects of Hypotheses 3
and 4, I included the product terms of age and
complexity with the different forms of slack. Be-
cause I hypothesized curvilinear relationships for
TABLE 2
Continued
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
3.34*** (0.61) 1.41*** (0.42) 2.04*** (0.59) 2.39*** (0.45)
6.67 (6.91) 6.09 (3.96) 8.02 (6.65) 20.74*** (4.14)
0.01† (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.003 (0.004)
0.0003† (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
0.42 (2.81) 0.40 (1.94) 3.85 (3.06) 0.91 (1.82)
2.91* (1.45) 0.78 (0.98) 1.15 (1.41) 1.19 (1.03)
0.17** (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) 0.15* (0.06) 0.04 (0.03)
1.55 (1.42) 1.32 (0.90) 1.23 (1.40) 0.70 (0.83)
0.93*** (0.03) 0.43*** (0.04) 0.63*** (0.04) 0.49*** (0.10)
0.00001 (0.00001) 0.00004** (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.00001) 0.0002** (0.0001)
0.07 (0.04) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
0.0004** (0.0001) 0.0001*** (0.00003) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0001* (0.0001)
0.15*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.06 (0.04) 0.34*** (0.04)
0.00001*** (0.00001) 0.0001*** (0.00001) 0.00005* (0.00002) 0.0001* (0.00003)
1.22*** (0.03) 1.26*** (0.03) 1.35*** (0.04) 1.50*** (0.05)
0.0001*** (0.000004) 0.0001*** (0.00002) 0.00005* (0.00002) 0.0002*** (0.00002)
0.01*** (0.002)
0.000002* (0.000001)
2.50*** (0.66)
0.003** (0.001)
0.003 (0.003) 0.0001 (0.002)
0.00001 (0.00001) 0.000009 (0.00001)
0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.08)
0.0003 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001)
0.002*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.01)
0.000001*** (0.0000001) 0.000001*** (0.0000002)
0.94*** (0.27) 0.77*** (0.26)
0.0004* (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001)
0.002** (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001)
0.000001*** (0.0000002) 0.000001*** (0.0000002)
0.95*** (0.29) 1.58*** (0.28)
0.00005 (0.0002) 0.00009 (0.0002)
55.33*** 22.96*** 35.45*** 35.57***
14,427.10 13,052.10 14,355.40 12,653.70
3,400.40*** 4,239.60*** 2,844.06*** 7,870.50***
2.39 104.73*** 36.01*** 419.38***
coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses.
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the main effects, I included the product terms of
moderators for the linear as well as the squared
terms of the slack variables. By doing so, I was able
to identify positive and negative concave relation-
ships (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The squared terms
provide a more complete explanation by prevent-
ing misinterpretation of effects due to linearity and
additivity in correlated variables (Cortina, 1993).
The moderating effect of age on the slack-perfor-
mance relationship (Hypothesis 3) was supported
in both high-discretion (model 3) and transient
slack measures (resource availability and resource
demand, model 5) but not in low-discretion slack
measures (model 4). As illustrated in Figure 1a, the
relationship between high-discretion slack and per-
formance is stronger (has a steeper positive slope)
in older firms than in younger firms. The moderat-
ing effects of industry complexity on the slack-
performance relationship (Hypothesis 4) were sup-
ported for both high-discretion and transient slack
but not for low-discretion slack. As seen in Figures
2a–2c, the slack-performance relationship becomes
negative (has a steeper negative slope) in more
complex than in less complex industry environ-
ments. Unlike age, for which the squared product
terms were significant, industry complexity had
significant squared product terms only for resource
availability, and not for the other forms of slack.
The implications are discussed next.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study provides valuable insights into the
accumulation and deployment of resources to
FIGURE 1a
Moderating Effects of Age on the Relationship between High-Discretion Slack and Performancea
FIGURE 1b
Moderating Effects of Age on the Relationship between Resource Availability and Performancea
a Performance and slack were measured in millions of dollars.
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achieve performance in privately held firms and
enriches the ongoing dialog on the importance of
resources. The study makes three important con-
tributions to organizational theory. First, a major
contribution is to develop causal logic for the
influence of different forms of slack on firm per-
formance. Though included in studies examining
the relationship between risk and return, a ration-
ale for the influence of slack has hitherto not
been the focus of much theory building and em-
pirical testing (Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000).
Also within this domain, I have introduced the
concept of transient slack, which captures slack
availability relative to a focal firm’s resource de-
mands. Second, this is the first study to test and
find support for the impact of resource con-
straints on the performance of privately held
firms using longitudinal data. The finding that
when resource demands exceed availability, per-
formance is likely to be higher in privately held
firms is meaningful and valuable for scholars,
entrepreneurs, and managers of private firms.
Third, this study explores the implications of age
and industry complexity for the slack-perfor-
mance relationship. The influence of age on slack
informs the resource constraints and entrepre-
neurship literatures. Also, most studies have
tested the implications of slack and environment
for strategic choices (Meyer, 1982; Smith et al.,
1991) but not for financial performance. By doing
so, this study makes strong theoretical and
empirical contributions by informing both the
behavioral theory and the resource constraints
literatures.
FIGURE 2a
Moderating Effects of Industry Complexity on the Relationship between
High-Discretion Slack and Performance
FIGURE 2b
Moderating Effects of Industry Complexity on the Relationship between
Resource Availability and Performance
a Measured in millions of dollars.
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Behavioral and Resource Constraints Roles in
Entrepreneurship
Is more better? Is less more? Proponents of be-
havioral theory have argued for the positive bene-
fits of slack (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963),
while others have argued that having fewer re-
sources may improve performance (Baker & Nel-
son, 2005; Mosakowski, 2002). My arguments here
combine both behavioral and resource constraints
views. The results provoke a reframing of the the-
oretical question for future research from the sim-
ple question of whether slack is good for perfor-
mance to a more complex set of questions: How
much of what form of slack is good for perfor-
mance? and When is slack good for performance?
Two distinct findings from this study inform a
behavioral perspective on resource slack. First, eco-
nomic performance increases and then decreases
with an increase in low-discretion slack, but per-
formance is positively related in linear manner to
increases in high-discretion slack. Behavioral argu-
ments emphasize a linear positive relationship, em-
phasizing the principle that more slack is better for
appeasing coalitions, experimentation, and risk
taking. My finding suggests that specific forms of
slack may have decreasing returns, depending on
the level of discretion that the slack provides man-
agers, and that redeployment of large amounts of
low-discretion slack can be counterproductive.
Second, when the resource demand and resource
availability components of transient slack are ana-
lyzed separately, the results are intriguing and in-
formative. Resource demand has a strong, positive
relationship with performance; expressed graphi-
cally, it is slightly concave rather than inverted
U-shaped. Greater resource demand is related to
higher levels of performance. Resource availability
exhibits a slightly concave relationship with per-
formance: substantially negative (1 standard de-
viation [s.d.] from the mean) resource availability
was associated with high performance ($240.1 mil-
lion), and substantially positive (1 s.d.) resource
availability was associated with low performance
($5.57 million), while the mean level of resource
availability was associated with moderate perfor-
mance ($131.9 million). Resource demand had a
greater impact on performance ($788.1 to 1,036.8
million at 1/1 s.d.) than resource availability.
This finding is theoretically important because it
underscores that resource availability in excess of
resource demand is unlikely to enhance perfor-
mance in privately held firms. These results
encourage researchers to consider a distinction be-
tween “absolute-to-external peers” and “relative-
to-internal demands” forms of slack. Although
these results support the idea of resource con-
straints having a positive performance effect, fur-
ther exploration using samples of entrepreneurial
high-growth firms is necessary before conclusions
about the nature and dynamism of this relationship
can be drawn. The present results should be sug-
gestive enough to persuade scholars to pay close
attention to the research question and its sensitivity
to the different forms of slack. In sum, behavioral
arguments that suggest linear positive relationships
between all forms of slack and performance do not
receive unconditional support in privately held
firms. The results suggest possible boundaries to
the assumptions of behavioral theory arguments,
particularly the argument that managerial discre-
tion has positive performance consequences in all
contexts.
FIGURE 2c
Moderating Effects of Industry Complexity on the Relationship between
Resource Demand and Performance
a Measured in millions of dollars.
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Age and Industry Effects
There are interesting organizational and environ-
mental findings in this study. The interaction be-
tween age and slack was significant in most cases,
with the exception of low-discretion slack. High-
discretion slack appeared to be of greater impor-
tance for older firms that have more predictable
resource needs. Age modified the slope of the rela-
tionship between slack and performance (Figures
1a and b). A shortfall (1 s.d.) of high-discretion
slack had a greater negative consequence ($–106.2
million) for the performance of older firms than for
the performance of younger firms ($–7.91 million).
An excess (1 s.d.) of high-discretion slack had a
greater positive effect on performance in older
firms ($281.5 million) than in younger firms
($213.7 million). Younger firms tended to exhibit
sharper increases in performance when resource
availability was high ($179.8 million) than when
availability was low ($67.8 million). Even when
availability was negative relative to the industry
average, younger firms tended to show positive per-
formance levels (Figure 1b). The impact of age on
resource availability in older firms was more mod-
est; there were marginal increases in performance
from $102.3 million at low availability (1 s.d.) to
$118.3 million at high resource availability (1
s.d.). This finding suggests that the impact of slack
varies with age of a firm and the type of resource.
Interesting results in the moderating effects for
industry complexity emerged as well. Findings
supported my hypothesis that an increase in indus-
try complexity makes the relationship between
slack and performance more negative (Hypothesis
4). Further analysis revealed that the pattern of
influence on resource availability requires a more
complicated explanation (Figure 2b). In low-com-
plexity industries, performance changes from
$208.7 million to $60.9 million at 1/1 s.d. of
resource availability. However, in high-complexity
industries, performance changes from $521.1 mil-
lion to $84.1 million at 1/1 s.d. of resource
availability. We find that when resource availabil-
ity is constrained (1 s.d.), performance is substan-
tially higher in high-complexity industries than in
low-complexity industries. When resource avail-
ability is high (1 s.d.), performance is lower (more
negative) for high-complexity industries. The effects
of complexity appear to be more pronounced when
resource constraints exist. This finding directly ad-
dresses the managerial and theoretical relevance of
resource constraints by articulating the impact of en-
vironment on slack deployment.
The moderating effect of complexity on the rela-
tionship of resource demand and performance also
adds to the value of my findings. The magnitude of
effect for resource demand on performance appears
to be higher than the impact of resource availability
on performance. In low-complexity industries, per-
formance changes from $1,049.9 million to
$709.5 million at 1/1 s.d. of resource demand
(Figure 2c). In high-complexity industries, perfor-
mance changes from $861.8 million to $461.1
million at 1/1 s.d. of resource demand. Here, as
resource demand increases, performance increases
in tandem, but it does so at a slower rate when
complexity is higher. Taken together, findings on
resource availability and demand have competing
influences on performance. In a broader pattern,
higher resource demand is associated with higher
levels of performance, while moderate negative lev-
els of resource availability are associated with pos-
itive performance levels. These moderated effects
suggest that resource constraints mechanisms are
more complex and dependent on organizational
and environmental factors than theorized in this
paper and in other studies. Both age and complex-
ity interaction effects imply that resource con-
straints influence performance, but further research
is required to fully explore the intricacies of this
argument.
Publicly Held versus Privately Held Firms
Some studies of slack have combined behavioral
and agency theory explanations of risk taking in
publicly held firms (Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000).
Although agency explanations may be appropriate
in large, publicly held firms, the agency relation-
ships in privately held firms may be different or
absent (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The theoretical and
practical implications of slack levels in firms raise
important and interesting questions. However, the
lack of sampling and measurement consistency
across studies of slack forecloses comparison of
public and private firms. It is likely that slack is
important for different reasons in public and in
private firms. Future research will need to recon-
cile the theoretical differences and the pattern of
relationships between privately and publicly held
firms in a longitudinal setting.
My study focused on privately held firms, but
fine-tuning of the current sample could expand
researchers’ limited knowledge of slack and its role
in organizational processes. For example, the dis-
tinction between nascent ventures, high-growth
firms (prior to initial public offering) and high-
growth (post-IPO) firms may increase the theoreti-
cal richness of the slack construct. Similarly, the
motivations and behaviors of managers may differ
for pre-IPO and post-IPO firms as the scrutiny of
2005 673George
public markets and the pressing need to deliver
positive results every fiscal quarter is minimized in
pre-IPO firms. Further research may help catego-
rize the behavioral differences among these firms
and may help further refine the logic for the slack-
performance relationship.
Limitations and Conclusions
Despite the care taken with the analysis and the
benefits of longitudinal study of privately held
firms, the present research has some limitations.
First, though the classification using the discretion-
ary nature of assets is appropriate for diverse forms
of slack, operational definition of slack using finan-
cial data does not account for other types of slack.
For example, resource endowments in social capi-
tal, human capital, or organizational capabilities
can be extended for the influence of slack within
these types of resources and its impact on entrepre-
neurial outcomes such as new market entry. Be-
cause firms need to invest resources to build organ-
izational capabilities and, therefore, incur costs
before any payoffs are imminent (e.g., George,
2005), slack resource endowments may play a par-
ticularly important role in the enactment of strate-
gies and the evolution of firms. Further investiga-
tion of the multiple forms of slack resources and
entrepreneurial firms’ ability to leverage and de-
ploy slack across potential alternate applications
for a specific resource are interesting and fruitful
avenues for scholarly inquiry.
Second, the longitudinal design provides some
temporal stability to these results, but these data
are restricted to a single time frame (1994–97).
Though I controlled for year effects, an extension to
this study might use panel data to account for dif-
ferent economic scenarios. Also, a longer time
frame could capture the dynamism in slack over
time. It is likely that slack levels change over time,
and tracking this change might allow for a richer
theoretical argument than presented in this article.
Third, since slack and size are correlated, there are
likely to be variations across industries in the im-
pact of slack on performance. Though I controlled
for industry effects, further studies might examine
multiple forms of slack in a single industry. For
example, augmenting work on slack in network
resources in the biotech industry and its impact on
innovation (e.g., George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002),
inclusion of financial and other forms of slack such
as human and social capital could provide a holis-
tic picture of an organization’s use of multiple re-
source endowments. Finally, the influence of age
on slack deployment is an understudied area. Slack
may assume greater levels of strategic importance
at certain stages of growth. For instance, slack may
be critical during growth stages but may be absent
then. The implications of slack for growth in entre-
preneurial firms is an important issue that needs to
be addressed methodically.
Limitations aside, this is the first study to theo-
rize and test causal relationships between slack and
performance in a longitudinal sample of privately
held firms. I found that the pattern of relationships
differs with the form of slack (high-discretion, low-
discretion, transient), and this finding contributes
to organizational theory that has, hitherto, ad-
dressed positive linear relationships between slack
and performance. The results support the resource
constraints argument in privately held firms. Sup-
port for this argument is seen especially when or-
ganizational age and industry complexity are con-
sidered as moderators. Taken together, the findings
offer preliminary evidence of the compatibility of
behavioral and resource constraints arguments in
explaining the dynamic of the slack-performance
relationship in the context of privately held firms.
Although I concentrated on privately held firms,
my findings on the pattern of resource demand and
availability might also apply in public firms. Thus,
this study contributes to pertinent discussion on
the leveraging of organizational resources to en-
hance performance through the adaptation and en-
actment of strategies in competitive environments.
Future studies can leverage these findings to pro-
vide comprehensive behavioral explanations for
the patterns and temporal dynamism in the gener-
ation and deployment of slack resources to achieve
organizational goals.
REFERENCES
Baker, T., & Nelson, R. 2005. Making do with what’s at
hand: Entrepreneurial bricolage. Administrative
Science Quarterly: In press.
Baker, T., Pricer, R., & Nenide, B. 2000. When less is
more: Undercapitalization as a predictor of firm suc-
cess. In P. Reynolds, E. Autio, C. Brush, W. Bygrave,
S. Manigart, H. Sapienza, & K. Shaver (Eds.), Fron-
tiers of entrepreneurship research: CD version.
Babson College: Babson Park, MA.
Bateman, T., & Zeithaml, C. 1989. The psychological
context of strategic decisions. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 10: 587–592.
Baum, R., Locke, E., & Smith, K. 2001. A multidimen-
sional model of venture growth. Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 44: 292–303.
Bourgeois, L. J. 1981. On the measurement of organiza-
tional slack. Academy of Management Review, 6:
29–39.
Bourgeois, L. J., & Singh, J. 1983. Organizational slack
674 AugustAcademy of Management Journal
and political behavior within top management
groups. Academy of Management Proceedings:
43–49.
Bromiley, P. 1991. Testing a causal model of corporate
risk taking and performance. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 34: 37–59.
Busenitz, L., & Barney, J. 1997. Differences between en-
trepreneurs and managers in large organizations: Bi-
ases and heuristics in strategic decision making.
Journal of Business Venturing, 12: 9–30.
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. 1983. Applied multiple regres-
sion/correlation analyses for the behavioral sci-
ences. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cooper, A. C., Dunkelberg, W. C., & Woo, C. Y. 1988.
Entrepreneurs’ perceived chances for success. Jour-
nal of Business Venturing, 3: 97–108.
Cortina, J. 1993. Interaction, nonlinearity and multicol-
linearity: Implications for multiple regressions. Jour-
nal of Management, 19: 915–922.
Cyert, R., & March, J. 1963. A behavioral theory of the
firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall.
Damanpour, F. 1987. The adoption of technological, ad-
ministrative, and ancillary innovations: Impact of
organizational factors. Journal of Management, 13:
675–688.
deMeza, D., & Southey, C. 1996. The borrower’s curse:
Optimism, finance and entrepreneurship. Economic
Journal, 106: 375–386.
Deephouse, D., & Wiseman, R. 2000. Comparing alterna-
tive explanations for accounting risk-return rela-
tions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 42: 463–482.
Dess, G., & Beard, D. 1984. Dimensions of organizational
task environments. Administrative Science Quar-
terly, 29: 52–73.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of owner-
ship and control. Journal of Law and Economics,
26: 301–325.
George, G. 2005. Learning to be capable: Patenting and
licensing at the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foun-
dation 1925–2002. Industrial & Corporate Change,
14: 119–151.
George, G., Zahra, S., & Wiklund, J. 2005. Ownership and
the internationalization of small firms. Journal of
Management, 31: 210–233.
George, G., Zahra, S., & Wood, D. 2002. The effects of
business-university alliances on the innovative out-
put and financial performance: A study of publicly
traded biotechnology companies, Journal of Busi-
ness Venturing, 17: 577–608.
Greve, H. 2003. Organizational learning from perfor-
mance feedback: A behavioral perspective on in-
novation and change. Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Hannan, M. 1998. Rethinking age dependence in organ-
izational mortality: Logical formalizations. Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 104: 126–164.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. 1994a. Sticking
it out: Entrepreneurial survival and liquidity con-
straints. Journal of Political Economy, 102: 53–75.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. 1994b. Entre-
preneurial decisions and liquidity constraints. Rand
Journal of Economics, 25: 334–347.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the
firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and owner-
ship structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:
305–360.
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. 1994. Timid choices and
bold forecasts. In R. Rumelt, D. Schendel, & D. Teece
(Eds.), Fundamental issues in strategy: A research
agenda: 71–76. Boston: HBS Press.
Leibenstein, H. 1980. Beyond economic man. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levi-Strauss, C. 1966. The savage mind. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Levinthal D. A. 1997. Adaptation on rugged landscapes.
Management Science, 43: 934–950
Levinthal, D., & March, J. 1981. A model of adaptive
organizational search. Journal of Economic Behav-
ior and Organization, 2: 307–333.
March, J. 1994. A primer on decision-making. New
York: Free Press.
Meyer, A. 1982. Adapting to environmental jolts.Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly, 27: 515–537.
Mosakowski, E. 2002. Overcoming resource disadvan-
tages in entrepreneurial firms: When less is more. In
M. Hitt, D. Ireland, D. Sexton, & M. Camp (Eds.),
Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating an inte-
grated mindset: 106–126 (strategic management se-
ries). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
National Science Foundation. 2000. Industry, technol-
ogy, and the global marketplace highlights, Indi-
cators 2000 (chapter 7): http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/
seind00/access/c7/c7h.htm.
Nohria, N., & Gulati, R. 1996. Is slack good or bad for
innovation? Academy of Management Journal, 39:
1245–1264.
Ross, J., & Staw, B. 1993. Organizational escalation and
exit: Lessons from the Shoreham nuclear plant.
Academy of Management Journal, 36: 701–732.
Sharfman, M., Wolf, G., Chase, R., & Tansik, D. 1988.
Antecedents of organizational slack. Academy of
Management Review, 13: 601–614.
Singh, J. 1986. Performance, slack, and risk taking in
organizational decision making. Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 29: 562–585.
Small Business Administration. 2003. Administration’s
economic plan (release # 03-02). Washington, DC:
SBA.
2005 675George
Smith, K., Grimm, C., Gannon, M., & Chen, M. 1991. Orga-
nizational information processing: Competitive re-
sponses and performance in the U.S. domestic airline
industry.Academy ofManagement Journal, 34: 60–85.
Starr, J., & MacMillan, I. 1990. Resource cooptation via
social contracting: Resource acquisition strategies
for new ventures. Strategic Management Journal,
11: 79–93.
Staw, B., Sandelands, L., & Dutton, J. 1981. Threat rigid-
ity effects in organizational behavior—A multilevel
analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26:
501–524.
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1965. Social structure and organiza-
tions. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of organiza-
tions: 142–193. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Tan, J., & Peng, M. 2003. Organizational slack and firm
performance during economic transitions: Two stud-
ies from an emerging economy. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 24: 1249–1264.
Thompson, J. 1967. Organizations in action. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Wiseman, R., & Bromiley, P. 1996. Towards a model of
risk in declining organizations: An empirical exam-
ination of risk, performance and decline. Organiza-
tion Science, 7: 524–543.
Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross-sec-
tion and panel data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerard (Gerry) George (ggeorge@bus.wisc.edu) is an as-
sistant professor of entrepreneurship at the University of
Wisconsin—Madison. His research interests include ca-
pability development in organizations, international en-
trepreneurship, university science and technology trans-
fer, and the innovation and performance of start-ups and
privately held firms. He serves as director of the applied
ventures program at the Weinert Center for Entrepreneur-
ship at the UW School of Business.
676 AugustAcademy of Management Journal
